In 1997 Nato Worked Out A Cooperative Agreement With Russia
“Opposition to NATO enlargement.” Archives arms Control Today, 7 June 1997, www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_06-07/natolet. In Kosovo, international attempts to find a solution lasted more than 3,000 days. In Crimea, Russia annexed part of Ukrainian territory in less than 30 days. It attempted to partially justify its illegal and illegitimate annexation by referring to a “referendum” incompatible with Ukrainian law, organized under conditions of illegal armed occupation, without access to opinion and media for the opposition and without credible international surveillance. However, the case for enlargement is stronger than before. Enlargement will contribute to the integration process which, over the past 50 years, has contributed to the stabilisation of Europe and has fostered the development of new strong allies in the fight against terrorism. And while cooperation with Russia in the field of terrorism is indeed essential, the September 11 attacks also helped to remind the Russians of their common interests with the United States and Europe. Far from supporting NATO enlargement, the Bush administration should welcome all European democracies whose political stability, military contributions and commitment to NATO solidarity would be an asset to the alliance. More than ever, Alliance leaders can and must aspire to a broader, integrated NATO and, at the same time, a strong and cooperative relationship with Russia. Individual allies have overseas bases on the basis of bilateral agreements and the principle of the host countries` agreement, unlike Russian bases on the territory of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), Ukraine (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and Georgia (regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The provisions of this law do not in any way give NATO or Russia a veto over the actions of the other, nor violate or limit the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action.
They cannot be used as a means of disadvantesing the interests of other states. The fact is that at the 1990 London Summit, Allied heads of state and government agreed: “We must unite to extend the long peace we have enjoyed over the past forty years.” It was their sovereign decision and it was fully in line with their right to collective defence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, the question of whether NATO will be expanded next year appears to have been answered. However, important questions remain as to who should enter, how NATO should welcome it and how to deal with Russia. Although formal decisions are only taken at next year`s Prague Summit, the Bush administration will require the need to reach consensus among NATO`s 19 members in time (probably by the summer of 2002), to take decisions as early as this winter, and to develop a strategy to begin the long and difficult process of consensus between Allies and the involvement of Congress and the American people. STANDEX was a technology development project. As with all these developments, the ultimate goal is a system put in place. NATO encouraged project participants to work to commercialize their technologies, and some of them are now commercially available. Pushkov, A. 1997. Don`t isolate us: a Russian vision of NATO enlargement.
National Interest 47: 58-63. To avoid the difficult decisions to decide on membership now, some analysts have devised an alternative approach, often referred to as a regatta – that would explain NATO`s intention to finally welcome all candidates, but to limit the number of people affected next year to a few. Proponents of this approach – modelled on the European Union (EU) enlargement strategy – argue that it creates the best of all worlds by assuring candidates that they will one day join NATO without provoking Russia or watering down the alliance by being part of an immediate and comprehensive enlargement.